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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Cuba-Mexico: Khrushchev will pay an "official visit" to Cuba after his trip to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly on 20 September, and, "on his way back, might stop off in Mexico,"

Khrushchev may use the occasion to announce the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuban arms deal and the extension of further credits to Cuba as a demonstration of Soviet support for the Castro regime. His presence in Cuba might prompt anti-Communist, anti-Castro demonstrations in Havana and other Cutan cities. According to a Mexican radiobroadcast on 7 September, the Soviet ambassador to Mexico has announced he will call a press conference shortly "to discuss the trip which Khrushchev plans to make to Mexico."

(Page 1)

*Berlin: The East German Government decree announced on 8 September requiring West Germans to secure special permits to enter East Berlin is a further step toward incorporation of the Soviet sector of Berlin into East Germany and gives the city sector border the character of an East German frontier. The West Germans now must meet the same requirements for entry into East Berlin as for travel in East Germany. The move, which clearly violates the four-power agreements guaranteeing freedom of movement within the city, appears to have bypassed the procedures normal in the past under which East Berlin municipal authorities re-enacted any legislation applying to the Soviet sector of Berlin.

Communist China: Peiping has used the occasion of the 100th Sino-US ambassadorial meeting to indicate that it does not expect any material results from further negotiations with the United States. A long editorial in the 8 September issue of People's Daily asserts that Peiping has no "unrealistic illusions" about the talks, but is willing to continue the meetings, which have been going on since 1955. The editorial reiterates Peiping's refusal to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait (Page 2) area.

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Vietnam: The "reunification" program for Vietnam outgress portends an intensified effort by Hanoi to eliminate the present Diem government in Saigon by support lined at the North Vietnamese Communist party's current conpresent Diem government in Saigon by supporting non-Communist as well as Communist dissident elements in the South. Communist guerrillas directed by Hanoi have long been creating a serious security situation for Saigon, which is also faced with discontent among various labor, student, and refugee circles. Calling for a "broad united front" in the South, North Vietnamese politburo member Le Duan stated on 5 September, "We will unite with all forces opposed to the US-Diem clique." He indicated Hanoi's immediate objective would be a coalition government in Saigon. (Page 3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Mali Federation: Mali Premier Modibo Keita apparently is still determined to react strongly if France recognizes Sene- \mathcal{J} gal's "secession" from the federation with Soudan. Keita, who is also premier of Soudan, reportedly has said that such French action would be considered a violation of France's accords with Mali and lead to pressure by the Federation Government--now almost entirely limited to Soudanese elements -- for the eviction of French troops from Mali. He allegedly also rejected participation in any new and looser West African association in which

> though French sympathies lie with Senegal, Paris' policy remains one of (Page 4) (Map) watchful waiting.

Senegal and Soudan would be treated as separate entities. Al-

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*Jordan:
ported unusual movements of Jordanian armored forces on 6, 7, and 8 September. While these movements may be aimed merely at creating a better defensive posture vis-a-vis the UAR, they could be preparatory to supporting a coup attempt in Syria.

Such an attempt, by Syrian conspirators in contact with King Husayn, was earlier scheduled for sometime this week, although subsequent information suggested the attempt had been postponed to mid-September.

Congo: Premier Lumumba's formal request on 8 September for the withdrawal of UN troops increases the threat of fighting between UN forces and Lumumba's supporters in the Congo. The premier's demand results from his belief that the UN officials were backing his rival Kasavubu. He probably has been encouraged to adopt a tough attitude by the propaganda support he has received from the USSR following Kasavubu's coup attempt.

Hammarskjold can be expected to put the whole weight of his office behind his effort to retain the UN troops in the Congo. In late August, before the Congolese crisis had reached its present impasse, he indicated that Lumumba must be "broken." He planned to insist that the UN forces must remain in the Congo to maintain peace and order because the Congolese National Army was incapable of doing so.

In Leopoldville the situation remains fluid between Kasavubu and Lumumba, but the premier won unexpected backing from the Senate--formerly believed to be an opposition stronghold--which cheered his accusations against Belgium and the United Nations.

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III. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Flag Issue in Panama: Significance in US-Panamanian Relations. SNIE 84-60. 6 September 1960.

Offshore Islands: Likelihood of Renewed Communist Chinese Military Activity in the Area in the Next Year or so and Consequence of the Loss, Evacuation, or Successful Defense of the Islands. SNIE 43-60. 6 September 1960.

LATE ITEM

*USSR-CUBA: A Soviet merchant ship, the Ilya Mechnikov, arrived in Cuba on 8 September with Moscow's first major arms delivery to the Castro regime. The ship loaded more than 4,000 tons of "varied" cargo at Nikolaev, the Soviet Black Sea arms export port, and is now unloading in East Havana under strict security precautions. Trucks lined up at Cabana Fortress are to remove the cargo to Las Villas province in central Cuba.

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Ehrushchev to Visit Council Possibly Mexico
Khrushchev will go on "official visit" to Cuba after his trip to New York for the compaged the UN General Assembly on 20 September.
Khrushchev to the see the occasion to announce the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuban arms deal and the extension of further credits to Cuba as a demonstration of Soviet support for the Castrogime. His presence in Cuba might prompt anti-Communist, anti-Castro demonstrations in Havana and other Cuban cities.
Khrushchev "might stop off in Mexico," but that he has no plans to visit Argentina or any other South American country. There have been reports that both the Soviet ambassador in Buenos Aires and First Deputy Chairman Kosygin, who headed the USSR's delegation to the Argentine sesquicentennial celebrations in May, have tried to arrange an exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Argentine President Frondizi.
According to a Mexican radiobroadcast of 7 September, the Soviet ambassador to Mexico, who returned from a month's vacation in the USSR the day before, has announced he will call a press conference shortly "to discuss the trip which Khrushchev plans to make to Mexico."
Official Mexican reception of Khrushchev would probably be correct but cool. The Lopez Mateos government had indicated that Khrushchev's presence at the mid-September celebrations of the 150th anniversary of Mexican independence would be unwelcome, by requesting that delegations be headed by officials of no higher rank than vice president.

Chinese Communists Issue Statement on Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks

Peiping has used the occasion of the 100th Sino-US ambassadorial meeting, which took place in Warsaw on 6 September, for a long People's Daily editorial blaming US "insincerity" for the fruitlessness of the talks. The editorial says that Peiping harbors no "unrealistic illusions" about the meetings, which have gone on since 1955, indicating that the Chinese do not expect any material results from further negotiations. Peiping argues that "imperialist" states will negotiate seriously and carry out agreements only when compelled to do so by a superior Communist negotiating position.

While Peiping says it will continue the meetings as long as the United States is also willing, it apparently intends to maintain its adamant position on all Sino-US issues. In the editorial the Chinese again assert that they will not renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait and reiterate their insistence on an agreement guaranteeing the "equal and reciprocal" exchange of newsmen between the US and China. Peiping has called for such an agreement since the United States said in 1957 that it could not guarantee "reciprocal" admission because of existing laws and regulations. The editorial reasserts the Chinese position that US "nationals" detained in China are rightfully convicted "criminals" and thus not subject to release under the Sino-US agreement of 1955.


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North Vietnam Outlines Reunification Plans

North Vietnam has announced its intention to support any group opposed to the present Saigon government, regardless of whether or not that group is Communist. Speaking to the third congress of the North Vietnamese Communist party on 5 September, Le Duan, second only to Ho Chi Minh in party rank, called for a broad united front in the South and clearly indicated that Hanoi believes there now is sufficient popular dissatisfaction with President Diem to permit expanding the "reunification struggle" beyond the purely guerrilla stage.

Le Duan defined the immediate task for Communists in the South as formation of a "national democratic coalition government" in Saigon. "We will unite with all forces opposed to the US-Diem clique," he said. Le Duan was careful not to include a specific exhortation to violence, but he used the current ideological jargon—about "different forms" of revolution—which permits any type of action which can be represented as an internal affair. Hanoi, in fact, may feel that, along with efforts to win over disgruntled non-Communists, an increase in guerrilla activity would be a desirable means for turning what now is a serious security situation into chaos.

in Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, including raids and ambushes, assassinations of local officials, and direct attacks on South Vietnamese Army forces.
This open approach by
Hanoi toward the formulation of a unified anti-Diem movement with
non-Communist opposition elements in Saigon might prove unpro-
ductive, however, since these groups have shown reluctance to
undertake actions vulnerable to Communist exploitation.
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Soudanese Thr Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C0316056711 Crisis

Modibo Keita, premier of the disrupted Mali Federation and its Soudanese component, was apparently disguising his real feelings when he stated publicly on 2 September that he was "very satisfied" with his talks that day with French President de Gaulle on the situation created by Senegal's withdrawal from the two-state federation on 20 August. Keita had in fact reacted negatively to intimations from De Gaulle that the rupture had resulted in a de facto situation which France would be obliged to recognize. French recognition of Senegal's independence would be considered a violation of France's accords with Mali and make "impossible" the continued presence of French troops "in Soudan or Senegal." Keita, who insists that Mali still exists and that Senegal's action was illegal, indicated that, if necessary, UN assistance would be sought to force the eviction of French troops. Such a reaction by the Soudanese would almost certainly include Soudan's departure from the French Community and might lead to close ties with Guinea. Soudan would not participate in any new and looser West African association in which Senegal and Soudan would be treated as separate independent entities rather than as a single federated state. Such a regrouping, embracing if possible all eight of the states of former French West Africa, including Guinea, has been publicly endorsed by Leopold Senghor-who was elected President of Senegal on 5 September -- and apparently is being actively promoted, with French encouragement, by Ivory Coast leader Houphouet-Boigny. Although French sympathies are largely with Senegal and De Gaulle reportedly has assured Senegalese Premier Mamadou Dia that France would recognize Senegal "at the proper time." France's policy of "watchful waiting" remained unchanged.

Congo Situation

Premier Lumumba's formal request on 8 September for the withdrawal of UN troops stems from his anger over what he sees as UN support for his rival Kasavubu. UN troops, in addition to controlling the radio station and the two Leopoldville airports, are guarding Kasavubu's residence. As a result of the steadily increasing tension, violent incidents may take place between UN forces and supporters of the premier.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold can be expected to put the whole weight of his office behind his effort to retain the UN troops in the Congo. In late August, before the Congo crisis had reached its present impasse, he indicated that Lumumba must be "broken." He planned to insist that the UN forces must remain in the Congo to maintain peace and order because the Congolese National Army was incapable of doing so. His aim at that time was to avoid a Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal, arguing that in the absence of such a resolution the UN military presence in the Congo would in effect be endorsed.

Radio Moscow followed up its strong support of Lumumba in Kasavubu's attempt to oust the premier with a slashing attack on Hammarskjold and the UN authorities in the Congo. In a widely broadcast commentary on 7 September it charged that they have "grossly contravened" the UN Security Council's resolutions by "openly pursuing an inimical attitude toward the Congo's legal government." Another commentary, based on an Izvestia article, charged that the Western powers, especially the United States, are acting under the "cover" of the United Nations banner and that Hammarskjold has violated his duty by "grossly interfering in the Congo's domestic affairs." Such support presumably encouraged Lumumba in his demands for evacuation of United Nations forces.

In Leopoldville the power struggle between Lumumba and Kasavubu remains unresolved. Lumumba, however, retains the initiative and has reasserted his control over the Congolese legislature. Following the confused session of the lower house on 7 September-

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whose results pro-Lumumba forces are treating as a victory for the premier--Lumumba won unexpected backing from the Senate, which supported the government with a 41-2 vote of confidence. The large number of abstentions and absences in the 78-member house indicates that opponents of Lumumba are unwilling to engage in an open test of strength with the premier.

Sympathy for Kasavubu's moderate position is indicated in the recent activity of army Chief of Staff Mobutu, who apparently is accepted in both the Kasavubu and the Lumumba camps and is highly regarded by Western military observers. Mobutu warned Foreign Minister Bomboko of his impending arrest, thereby enabling Bomboko to escape to the American Embassy and thence to Kasavubu's residence. Mobutu apparently is trying to remove the army from politics and is also concerned over the presence with the army of Soviet mechanics who accompanied the recent shipment of trucks from the USSR.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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